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NONCUMULATIVE ZONING IN ILLINOIS
Harry B. Madsen*
L OOKING SOUTH from an upper floor of the Main Post Office
Building in Chicago, one can plainly see the point on DeKoven
Street where, as the story goes, Mrs. O'Leary's cow, Madeline,
kicked over a lantern in a back yard shed and began the great
Chicago Fire of 1871. DeKoven Street and a large part of Chicago
was laid to ruins by the holocaust, but in a short time was rebuilt
more solidly than before. DeKoven Street and a surrounding
area of almost ninety acres has been leveled again, this time at
the instance of The Chicago Land Clearance Commission.1 The
land is being sold to industrial users who have a security against
blight unknown to their predecessors in title during the develop-
ment cycles that twice reduced the area to rubble. That security
is the noncumulative aspect of The Chicago Zoning Ordinance.
2
A noncumulative zoning ordinance is one which excludes
higher class uses from lower class districts. The concept can best
be clarified by reviewing the cumulative effect of the typical zon-
ing ordinance. The typical zoning ordinance reserves one district
exclusively for residences. The second district, zoned for com-
mercial uses, also admits residential uses. Finally, the industrial
district admits all uses permitted in the commercial district.
3
Thus, the cumulative effect is that each successive district admits
* The author is a graduate of Chicago-Kent College of Law and a member of the
Illinois Bar.
1 The Chicago Land Clearance Commission was created under Ill. Rev. Stat. 1959,
Vol. 2, Ch. 67 , § 66. §§ 63-91 of that Chapter are known as the "Blighted Areas
Redevelopment Act of 1947." Subject to the approval of the State Housing Board,
a Land Clearance Commission may designate "Slum and Blighted Area Redevelop-
ment Projects" and may acquire, condemn, improve and sell land.
2 The Chicago Zoning Ordinance was passed by the City Council of Chicago
on May 29, 1957, and was published in pamphlet form. Pursuant to special statu-
tory requirements in Illinois governing the enactment and amendment of zoning
ordinances, it is not included in the Municipal Code of Chicago.
3 This illustration is greatly oversimplified. Chicago, for example, has seventy
different categories of use districts. See, The Chicago Zoning Ordinance, Article 4.
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the uses of all the more restricted districts. The industrial dis-
trict, the lowest class use district, is open to all uses enumerated
anywhere in the ordinance. By striking the clauses admitting to
each district the uses of more restricted districts, the ordinance
would be rendered noncumulative. This would result in commer-
cial and industrial districts enjoying the same exclusiveness ac-
corded only to residences under the cumulative ordinance.
The constitutionality of this new city planning device, the
noncumulative zoning ordinance, was recently indicated for the
first time in Illinois in the case of People ex rel. Skokie Town
House Builders, Inc. v. Village of Morton Grove.4 In that case,
the plaintiff landowner petitioned for a writ of mandamus to
compel village officials to issue the permits necessary for the
construction of four town house buildings in a commercial use
district. The defendant pleaded a noncumulative zoning ordinance
as an affirmative defense and the plaintiff in its reply, contended
that the ordinance was void in that it violated the due process
clauses of both the State and Federal Constitutions.' The plain-
tiff's motion for a summary judgment was granted by the trial
court which concluded that the ordinance was unconstitutional.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Illinois took the position that
such an ordinance was within the police power of the state al-
though it ultimately affirmed on other grounds.'
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE NONCUMULATIVE
ZONING ORDINANCE
Legislative restriction on the use of private property in the
form of zoning ordinances evolved only after centuries of the
development of the law of nuisance. Blackstone said a nuisance
"is anything done to the hurt of the lands, tenements or heredita-
ments of another." 7 He further observed that "common or public
416 Ill. (2d) 183, 157 N. E. (2d) 33 (1959).
5 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. II, § 2; U. S. Const., Amend. XIV.
6 The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff had acquired a nonconforming use
under an earlier cumulative zoning ordinance before it was amended to make it
noncumulative.
7 3 Bl. Com. 216.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
nuisances are offenses against the public order or economical
regimen of the state, being either the doing of a thing to the
annoyance of the King's subjects or the neglecting to do a thing
the common good requires."" The Supreme Court of the United
States observed in 1897:
Ever since Aldred's Case . . . it has been the settled law,
both of this country and England, that a man has no right
to maintain a structure upon his own land, which, by reason
of disgusting smells, loud or unusual noises, thick smoke,
noxious vapors, the jarring of machinery or the unwarrant-
able collection of flies, renders the occupant of adjoining prop-
erty dangerous, intolerable or even uncomfortable to its
tenants. No person maintaining such a nuisance can shelter
himself behind the sanctity of private property.9
Disaster and the establishment of new cities have long im-
pelled legislative bodies to publish comprehensive urban develop-
ment plans with ever increasing consequences on private use. In
1666, the Great Fire of London moved Parliament to pass an act
for the rebuilding of the City of London. Washington, D. C., seat
of our federal government since 1800, is a classic example of
planned development. The plan, drawn by L'Enfant, a French
engineer, at the request of George Washington, laid out a net-
work of beautiful boulevards and circles as the basis of a military
fortress of circle-emplaced cannons covering one another and each
commanding fire in six directions. Salt Lake City, which was
laid out by newly settled Mormons in 1847, is one of the few
American cities with streets adequate to accommodate modern
traffic. The elaborate park system of Chicago, laid out in 1860,
culminated with the institution of the Burnham Plan in 190,9 to
complete a system of tree-lined, commerce-free boulevards along
the then entire perimeter of the city.
8 4 Bi. Com. 166.
9 Camfleld v. United States, 176 U. S. 518, 17 S. Ct. 864, 41 L. Ed. 260 (1897).
The Court of the King's Bench held in Aldred's Case in 1612, "An action on the
case lies for the erection of a hog stye so near the house of the plaintiff that the
air thereof was corrupted." 77 Eng. Rep. 816.
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The nineteenth century industrial development in the United
States was matched by a population increase to 75 million by
1900. With the great increase in use density, problems developed
which required additional restrictions in respect to the use of
private lands.10 By 1925, a veritable flood of zoning legislation
had swept the country and the tendency was in the direction of
extending the power of restriction in and of city planning." The
generally acknowledged principle of these ordinances was that
zoning was intended to preserve rather than to restrict dwell-
ings.12 The zoning ordinance of the Village of Euclid, Ohio, the
constitutionality of which was affirmed by the Supreme Court of
the United States in 1926,13 was typical of the earlier ordinances
in that it admitted the uses of more restricted districts, to districts
of less restricted uses.
The Supreme Court of Illinois said in 1925 that the danger
of fire and risk of contagion are often lessened by the exclusion
of stores and factories from areas devoted to residences and, in
consequence, the safety and health of the community may be
promoted.'4 Having thus saved the cottage from the slaughter
house, the principle was extended to allow the exclusion of apart-
ment buildings from districts devoted to residences, 15 and finally
to keep the toxic fumes of industry out of the market place. 16
10 Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365, 47 S. Ct. 114,
71 L. Ed. 303 (1926).
11 The Supreme Court of California observed: "According to a recent bulletin
of the United States Department of Commerce, 35 states and the District of
Columbia have adopted (zoning regulations) ; 221 municipalities have been zoned
and over 22,000,000 inhabitants, aggregating over 40 per cent of the urban popu-
lation of this country, are living in zoned territory." Miller v. Board of Public
Works, 195 Cal. 477, 234 P. 31, 384 (1925). With reference to the exercise of
the police power in zoning regulations, the same court said: "Every intendment
is to be indulged by the courts in favor of the validity of its exercise and, unless
the measure is clearly oppressive, it will be deemed within the purview of that
power." Id., at 385.
12 People ex rel. Skokie Town House Builders, Inc. v. Village of Morton Grove,
16 Il. (2d) 183, 157 N. E. (2d) 33 (1959).
is Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365, 47 S. Ct. 114,
71 L. Ed. 303 (1926).
14 City of Aurora v. Burns, 319 fll. 84, 149 N. E. 784 (1925).
15 City of Chicago v. Cohn, 326 Ill. 372, 158 N. E. 118 (1927).
16 Cleaners Guild of Chicago v. City of Chicago, 312 Ill. App. 102, 37 N. E. (2d)
857 (1941).
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Although the courts frown upon the total exclusion of a lawful
business from the boundaries of a municipal corporation, they
have not objected to zoning ordinances which simply provide for
a catch-all district to which industry and other undesired land
uses are relegated as zoning stepchildren. 17 While industrial areas
continued to be assaulted with construction of all types, some
degree of relief has been afforded by districting areas on the basis
of performance standards."8
ECONOMIC MOTIVATION FOR THE NONCUMULATIVE
ZONING ORDINANCE
The economic force bidding for the adoption of noncumula,
tive zoning ordinances may be presented from two basic view-
points: First, the prevention, rehabilitation and elimination of
slum and blight areas; and second, the creation of a favorable
environment for commerce and industry.
Age is one of the factors contributing to blight areas, but
it is not the principal one. The most charming tourist attrac-
tions in a state are often the oldest urban areas. Far more
effective as a catalyst of blight is the admixture of incompatible
land uses. The mixing of incompatible land uses promotes blight
in several ways. A residence owner loses incentive to maintain
his property when the smoke and noise of industry is all about
Also, those who build residences in industrial areas tend to build
shabbily and use cheap materials. Businessmen in such surround-
ings budget nothing for beautification and local stores and taverns,
at best, match their neighbors in appearance. Blight not only
depreciates the assessed valuation of property, but taxes assessed
in slum areas are often delinquent. The area cleared by the
17 For example, one Illinois zoning ordinance provides: "The property contained
in District I-1 may be used for any purpose, provided no actionable nuisance is
created." Centralia, Illinois Ordinance No. c-604, Art. V.
18 "A performance standard is a criterion established to control noise, odor,
smoke, toxic or noxious matter, vibration, fire and explosive hazards, and glare
or heat generated by or inherent in uses of land or buildings." The Chicago Zon-
ing Ordinance, Article 4. By application of these standards, heavy industry, such
as that of ore refining, has been excluded from areas open to light manufacturing.
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Chicago Land Clearance Commission around Mrs. O'Leary's cow
shed is expected to yield over 500 per cent more per year in
taxes than the same area steeped in slum.19
Until World War II, urban development was in the form of
huge "bubble" cities billowing out from sea ports and railroad
terminals. Today, under the impetus of modern highways and
automobiles, neighboring municipalities are being merged into
massive "strip cities." Subdividers and industrial developers
leapfrog down the highway. Farm towns along the way blossom
into thriving suburbs. Accelerating the trend is the housewife
who slips behind the wheel of the family car to do the day's
marketing. The territory from Hammond, Indiana, through Chi-
cago to Milwaukee, Wisconsin, will soon be a single integrated
metropolitan area-a giant strip city.2 ° Out on the highway, the
industrial user can find adequate space to build sprawling plants
and parking lots. His alternatives back in the city are not attrac-
tive. There he is faced with clearing title to a multiplicity of
small parcels. He may either have to bear the expense of both
buying and razing strategically located residences, or he will
have to cope with the erection of his plant on an irregularly shaped
plot. If he meets these problems, more remain. Vandalism and
pilferage can be a menace. And for accepting these several
burdens in a cumulative district, the industrial user must pay
for the privilege by bearing the brunt of the taxes ignored by his
delinquent residential neighbors.
If municipalities wish to retain their commercial and indus-
trial tax plums they must compete with the advantages to be
gained in the wide open spaces where the car-pools flow freely.
Commerce and industry must be recognized for what they are,
necessary and desirable elements of the community. 21 Although
19 This estimate is based on figures given to the author orally by an official of
The Chicago Land Clearance Commission.
20 "Cities as Long as Highways; That's America of the Future," 42 U. S. News
and World Report (Apr. 11, 1957), pp. 27-31.
21 People ex rel. Skokie Town House Builders, Inc. v. Village of Morton Grove,
16 Ill. (2d) 183, 157 N. E. (2d) 33 (1959).
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the jumble of existing nonconforming uses in industrial areas
is another phase of the problem to be solved, much of the exodus
of commerce and industry would be checked by reasonable secu-
rity that an already bad situation would not get worse. The
noncumulative zoning ordinance is peculiarly well suited to pro-
vide this security.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY AUTHORITY FOR THE
NONCUIMULATIVE ZONING ORDINANCE
It has been shown that the history of zoning is a pattern of
increased particularity in the restriction of land uses. Pro-
gressively further encroachments of private property rights have
been upheld as reasonable exercises of the police power in the
name of health, welfare, safety and morals. In the view of the
Supreme Court of the United States, this increase in regulation
is justified by the increased complexities of modern life. In
1926, they said:
Regulations, the wisdom, necessity, and validity of which, as
applied to existing conditions, are so apparent that they are
now uniformly sustained, a century ago, or even a half cen-
tury ago, probably would have been rejected as arbitrary
and oppressive. Such regulations are sustained, under the
complex conditions of our day, for reasons analogous to
those which justify traffic regulations, which before the advent
of automobiles and rapid transit street railways, would have
been condemned as fatally arbitrary and unreasonable. And
in this there is no inconsistency, for, while the meaning of
constitutional guaranties never varies, the scope of their
application must expand or contract to meet new and different
conditions which are constantly coming within the field of
their operation. In a changing world it is impossible that
it should be otherwise. But although a degree of elasticity
is thus imparted, not to the meaning, but to the application
of constitutional principles, statutes and ordinances, which
NONCUMULATIVB ZONING IN ILLINOIS
after giving due weight to the new conditions, are found
clearly not to conform to the Constitution, of course, must
fall . 2
2
The distinctive new feature of the noncumulative zoning
ordinance is the exclusiveness of each district. Exclusiveness
per se is not new in that the sanctity of the residential area
was the central purpose of early ordinances. Safety and health
were long ago shown to be substantially promoted by the ex-
clusion of stores and factories from areas devoted to residences.
To validate the exclusion of residences from commercial and
industrial districts it must likewise be shown that the exclusion
bears a substantial relationship to the preservation of the public
health, safety, morals or general welfare. Strikingly, the same
arguments which support the exclusiveness of residences in cumu-
lative ordinances apply even more vigorously to justify their
exclusion in noncumulative ordinances. The Supreme Court of
Illinois has noted a few, as follows:
The dangers of heavy traffic are greater in mixed residential-
industrial or residential-commercial districts than in districts
devoted to just one purpose. Industrial and commercial dis-
tricts are not good places to bring up families from a health
standpoint; and the presence of children in and about indus-
trial and commercial districts leads to a demand for school,
park and play-ground facilities in an area where there is
either no land available or the land available is ill suited to
such uses. 2
These familiar arguments were reinforced when the same court
noted additional reasons which are peculiar to the philosophy of
the noncumulative zoning ordinance. They said:
The general welfare of the public may be enhanced if industry
and commerce are provided with favorable climate. The
22 Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365, 387, 47 S. Ct. 114.,
118, 71 L. Ed. 303, 310 (1926).
23 People ex rel. Skokie Town House Builders, Inc. v. Village of Morton Grove,
16 Ill. (2d) 183, 188, 157 N. E. (2d) 33, 36 (1959).
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sale of a few lots at important points in a district may make
industrial or commercial expansion impossible or prohibi-
tively expensive. To protect the residents in a district, traffic
may be slowed down unduly and thus detract from the
efficiency of production and trade. In final analysis, it seems
clear that industry and commerce are also necessary and
desirable and that a proper environment for them will pro-
mote the general welfare of the public. We are of the
opinion that the exclusion of residences from a commercial
or industrial district is within the police power of the state.24
While the proponent of a zoning ordinance points, to the police
power to justify the regulation, his opponent typically pleads
that notwithstanding a substantial relation to the police power,
the ordinance is void as a deprivation of property without due
process of law. Thus, there are two constitutional hurdles to
cross, of which due process is the more difficult.
Though the trend is toward increased restrictions on private
property, there are limits the zoning ordinances must not tran-
scend. A zoning ordinance may not so limit the use of private
land as to eliminate the only uses for which it is suited.25 Nor
may the use of land be so limited that its value for the permitted
use is only a small fraction of what it would be for another pur-
pose. There is no stable formula as to what percentage of loss
in value constitutes an unconstitutional taking in Illinois, but an
analysis of the cases reviewed by the Supreme Court reveals
that a taking of two-thirds of the unrestricted use value has
been disallowed, 21 while a taking of less than that proportion has
been upheld. 7 Were it not for the due process check on the police
24 People ex rel. Skokie Town House Builders, Inc. v. Village of Morton Grove,
16 Ill. (2d) 183, 189, 157 N. E. (2d) 33, 36 (1959).
25 Zoning ordinance arbitrarily classifying as "Class A Residence" property, lots
of which were peculiarly unattractive for residential purposes, and best use of
which was for business purposes, held void as to such property. People v. City
of Rockford, 354 Ill. 377, 188 N. E. 446 (1933).
26 People ex rel. Kirby v. City of Rockford, 363 I1. 531, 2 N. E. (2d) 842 (1936).
27 For a survey of cases involving the validity of zoning restrictions limiting
property values, see Midland Electric Coal Corp. v. County of Knox, 1 Ill. (2d)
200, 214, 115 N. E. (2d) 275, 283 (1953).
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power, a taking of over 100 per cent would be possible by an
ordinance rendering land useless for any private purpose while
other laws continued to impose land taxes on the owner.
28
Statutory authority for the exclusion of residences from
commercial and industrial districts is found in the Illinois Re-
vised Cities and Villages Act. 29 Therein is a delegation to munic-
ipalities of the power to classify, regulate and restrict the loca-
tion of buildings designed for special industrial, business, resi-
dential and other uses. Municipalities are also delegated the
power to prohibit uses, buildings, or structures incompatible with
the character of such districts 0 Thus, as in the case of constitu-
tionality, we find the statutory authority for the cumulative and
the noncumulative ordinances emanating from the same source.
POLITICAL OBSTACLES TO THE NONCUMULATIVE
ZONING ORDINANCE
While it has been established that there are adequate con-
stitutional and statutory bases for a valid noncumulative zoning
ordinance in Illinois, there remain considerations of a political
nature which may slow its general acceptance. Denying a land-
owner the right to build a home for his family is a matter intensely
more sensitive than forbidding another the right to operate a
foundry in his back yard. The noncumulative ordinance is also
more vulnerable to the charge of "economic segregation"31 than
conventional forms of zoning. The fact that both these objec-
tions will be overruled by the courts, as ineffective attempts to
impute civil rights characteristics to property rights, does not
remove the political delicateness born of the fact that residents
and not businesses hold sway at the polls.
25 This anomaly was pointed out by the Court of Appeals of New York when
it said, "The only substantial difference, in such case, between restriction and
actual taking, is that the restriction leaves the owner subject to the burden of
taxation, while outright confiscation would relieve him of that burden." Averne
Bay Construction Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N. Y. 222, 15 N. E. (2d) 587 (1938).
29 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1959, Vol. 1, Ch. 24, §§ 73-1, et seq.
30 Id., § 73-1.
31 See 1954, U. Ill. Law Forum 186 at 201.
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Noncumulative zoning represents an abrupt extension of the
zoning concept which has heretofore been cautiously liberalized,
inch by inch, as it yielded to set-back provisions, 32 minimum height
requirements, 33 density limitations, 34 and minimum construction
standards.35 These developments progressively qualified the rights
of the residential land user. The noncumulative ordinance rep-
resents not another restriction on the residential user, but a
complete elimination of his use from designated districts.
The most serious stumbling block to the application of the
noncumulative zoning ordinance is the enormous increase in non-
conforming uses that will result when existing residences in com-
mercial and industrial districts, previously immune from classi-
fication as nonconforming uses, will be swept into that stigmatized
category which is so often a prelude to amortization provisions.
Even if an amortization schedule is constitutional,36 it may be of
32 A setback restriction in a county zoning ordinance required plaintiff's land
to have a building line 97 feet from existing 66 foot right of way on highway.
This was held unconstitutional and void as applied to plaintiff's property, where
county board of commissioners had found that a setback of 30 feet from a 200
foot superhighway right of way was reasonably adequate to promote and safe-
guard public welfare, and the record showed that the primary purpose of the
special setback restriction as applied to plaintiff's property was to hold down the
cost of acquiring additional land for widening of the highway. Galt v. Cook County,
405 Il. 396, 91 N. E. (2d) 395 (1950).
33 An ordinance fixing a minimum height for buildings within a particular area
was held unauthorized. Brown v. Board of Appeals of City of Springfield, 327 Ill.
644, 159 N. E. 225 (1927).
84 An application for a permit to build an apartment building in a residence dis-
trict adjacent to Lake Michigan was refused. Minkus v. Pond, 326 Ill. 467, 15g
N. E. 121 (1927).
35 For a detailed discussion of constitutional attacks on minimum floor area
ordinances, see McClory, "The Undersized House: A Municipal Problem," 27
C]ICAGO-KENT LAW RrviEw 142.
36 Although the Supreme Court of Illinois has not had occasion to test the va-
lidity of amortization provisions in zoning ordinances, it did acknowledge the exist-
ence of such a provision without negative comment in dictum when it said, "The
city argues that by enjoining the enforcement of the comprehensive amendment of
1942, as applied to plaintiff's property, the court has interfered with the power
of the city to regulate and eventually eliminate nonconforming uses. . . . In
view of our holding that the rezoning was invalid insofar as the plaintiff's prop-
erty is concerned, the nonconforming section of the amending ordinance is no
longer involved." Building Corp. v. City of Chicago, 395 Ill. 138, 153, 69 N. E.
(2d) 827, 834 (1947). Illinois courts have consistently designated nonconform-
ing uses as "property rights," Brown v. Gerhardt, 5 Ill. (2d) 106, 125 N. E. (2d)
53 (1955) ; Village of Skokie v. Almendinger, 5 Ill. App. (2d) 522, 126 N. E. (2d)
421 (1955) ; Douglas v. Village of Melrose Park, 389 Ill. 98, 58 N. E. (2d) 864
(1945) ; Western Theological Seminary v. City of Evanston, 325 Ill. 511, 156 N. E.
788 (1927), and the Supreme Court of Illinois has called the use acquired by
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questionable merit economically and in those areas where there
is an extensive admixture of land uses coupled with blight there
will be great pressure to rehabilitate the area by eminent domain
proceedings rather than by leaving the burden of amortization of
nonconforming uses to private owners.
CITY PLANNING AND THE NONCUMULATIVE ZONING ORDINANCE
City planning does not involve the adoption of an inflexible
zoning ordinance. Planning and zoning are dynamic institutions
which, when properly administrated, are frequently subject to
modification to meet the changing demands of the area.37 When
the plan and the needs of the community are in conflict, the latter
should prevail. Where the needs of the community are accurately
anticipated a city plan might involve a succession of specifica-
tions in a single district to, for instance, smooth the evolution from
a blighted mixture of uses to a designed industrial district, always
keeping within the bounds of reasonable encroachment or prop-
erty rights. Such a transition could well be initiated by the ap-
plication of a noncumulative ordinance which would tolerate all
existing nonconforming uses, but which would prevent further
mixture. Subsequent amendments could phase out the uses in-
cidental to the residences in the area and encourage the develop-
ment of uses which would support its industrial character. After
a number of years, with the grocery stores and laundries replaced
by lunch counters and currency exchanges, the then older resi-
dences could more readily be amortized. This procedure could
accomplish, over a period of years, substantially the same result
a landowner under an existing zoning ordinance a "vested right," Skokie Town
House Builders, Inc. v. Village of Morton Grove, 16 Ill. (2d) 183, 157 N. E. (2d)
33 (1959). This attitude would seem to indicate that a case involving a dis-
pute over an amortization provision would undergo much closer scrutiny in Illi-
nois than in other jurisdictions where amortization provisions of as short a time
as one year have been upheld, Dema Realty v. Jacoby, 168 La. 752, 123 So. 314
(1929).
57 A municipal corporation has authority to amend Its zoning ordinance, Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1959, Vol. 1, Ch. 24, § 73-8. However, a property owner has a right
to rely upon the rule that the classification of his property for zoning purposes
will not be changed unless the change is required for the public good. Northern
Trust Co. v. City of Chicago, 4 Ill. (2d) 432, 123 N. E. (2d) 330 (1954).
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as condemnation under eminent domain, land clearance and resale
to private industrial users which is a prohibitively expensive solu-
tion on a city wide basis.
The reader must not fall into the easy trap of assuming that
a noncumulative zoning district is limited to a single land use.
On the contrary, this is never the case although there is typically
a major use to which the other uses permitted are incident. Even
the typical cumulative ordinance permits the erection of schools,
churches, parks and playgrounds in single family residence dis-
tricts. Similarly, The Chicago Zoning Ordinance permits the
erection of drug stores, currency exchanges, filling stations and
restaurants in light industrial districts. 8 The fact that the enu-
meration of permitted uses in a noncumulative zone may be of
considerable length does not contravene its restrictive effect, for,
as in all documents of enumerated powers, the effect is much more
restrictive than would be a grant of general powers subject to
listed exceptions. Further, the non-industrial uses permitted in
the light industrial districts are harmonious to and in support
of the major use assigned to the district.
The noncumulative ordinance is not a cure-all. It may occur
that a noncumulative ordinance, valid when enacted, will become
undesirable as the character of the community changes. Such a
situation may be developing in Chicago today. The Chicago Zon-
ing Ordinance provides that in certain business districts dwelling
uses are not permitted below the second floor.3 9 Thus, this section
of the ordinance is noncumulative as to the first level. Since the
enactment of this provision in 1953, the erection of super markets
and shopping centers has so changed the flow of trade that hun-
dreds of small "store front" shops now stand empty, wanting
for tenants. Owners of these buildings, prohibited from making
residential use of the first level, are limited to the income they
can derive from the second and higher floors. With their revenue
thus limited the owners are often unable or unwilling to properly
38 The Chicago Zoning Ordinance, Article 10.3-1.
39 The Chicago Zoning Ordinance, Article 8.3-2, Clause A (1).
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maintain the properties which are rapidly falling into disrepair.
The effect of this well intended noncumulative zoning ordinance
is to line secondary business streets in many areas of Chicago with
fringes of blight, which like rotten ropes are starting to strangle
what remains of neighborhood integrity in the areas they sur-
round."
COlNCLUSION
Noncumulative zoning is a logical projection of the historical
trend in zoning, which is a record of ever increasing particularity
in legislative use restriction on private land. The noncumulative
zoning ordinance is at the same time a radical departure from
the thinking and opinions of the past which sought to preserve
rather than to restrict residential construction. A number of such
ordinances have been adopted in Illinois,4 and only one challenge
against them has reached the Supreme Court of Illinois.
42
Social forces recognize the noncumulative zoning ordinance
as a weapon against slum and blight. Economic forces demand
40 In a press release dated January 7, 1960, The Chicago Plan Commission in-
cluded the following recommendation of amendment to The Chicago Zoning Ordi-
nance: "Amend Article 8, Section 8.4-1, to allow as a Special Use, dwelling units
on the ground floor of existing buildings located in all Business (B) Districts.
The current trend of construction of new shopping centers based on the modern
concept of clustering stores and providing a large common parking area to serve
them, has left many vacant stores along the business streets in the older portions
of the city. Many of these vacant stores have apartments above and the buildings
themselves are too substantial to wreck. The suggested change in the B Districts
to allow as a Special Use (where considered appropriate) a residential use on the
ground floor of existing buildings would be beneficial in conserving the older
areas of the city, by making the conversion of vacant stores to apartments pos-
sible."
41 On April 22, 1958, The Village of Morton Grove amended its zoning ordinance
so as to prohibit the future construction of dwelling units in districts other than
those designated as dwelling districts. The Village of Morton Grove, Illinois, Zon-
ing Ordinance. On May 29, 1957, The Chicago City Council adopted a compre-
hensive amendment to The Chicago Zoning Ordinance which included in its pur-
poses, "To prohibit uses, buildings or structures which are incompatible with the
character of development or the permitted uses within specified zoning districts."
The Chicago Zoning Ordinance, Article 2, Section (8). On July 20, 1953, Chicago
Heights adopted a zoning ordinance which operates in most instances on the prin-
ciple of the exclusiveness of each zone. This ordinance also reversed the accepted
practice by setting out the industrial districts first, then the commercial districts,
and finally the residential districts. The Chicago Heights, Illinois, Zoning Ordi-
nance.
42 People ex rel. Skokie Town House Builders, Inc. v. Village of Morton Grove,
16 Ill. (2d) 183, 157 N. E. (2d) 33 (1959).
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the type of protection afforded by noncumulative zoning for local
industry, which will otherwise abandon the city for rural sites.
Land values and taxes are at stake. These forces are being applied
to a legislative concept that is constitutionally sound and statu-
torily authorized.
Notwithstanding political obstacles, it appears the forces
favorable to the noncumulative zoning ordinance will prevail. The
implementation of their purpose will be deceptively simple. In
most cases an amendment striking short clauses will suffice. Even
the classic zoning ordinance of the Village of Euclid, Ohio, as it
stood in 1926, could have been rendered totally noncumulative by
an amendment striking five words, ten commas and fourteen
symbols.43
43 The zoning ordinance of the Village of Euclid, Ohio, which was endorsed by
the Supreme Court of the United States in 1926, see note 13, ante, set the pat-
tern for hundreds of cumulative zoning ordinances enacted thereafter. Nonethe-
less, that cumulative ordinance could have been rendered noncumulative by de-
leting from the following sections the material set out parenthetically. Delete
from Section 5, (U1 or) ; from Section 6, (Ul, U2 or) ; from Section 8, (U1, U2,
U3 or) ; from Section 9, (U1, U2, U3, U4 or) ; and from Section 10, (U1, U2, U3,
114, U5 or).
